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Abstract—Since the beginning of the digital area, privacy and
anonymity have been impacted drastically (both, positively and
negatively), by the different technologies developed for communi-
cations purposes. The broad possibilities that the Internet offers
since its conception, makes it a mandatory target for those entities
that are aiming to know and control the different channels of
communication and the information that flows through.
In this paper, we address the current threats against privacy and
anonymity on the Internet, together with the methods applied
against them. In addition, we enumerate the publicly known
entities behind those threats and their motivations. Finally, we
analyze the state of the art concerning the protection of the
privacy and anonymity on the Internet; introducing future lines
of research.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the familiarity of the concepts, privacy and
anonymity are commonly misunderstood within the digital
context. In this paper, we refer to these concepts as foundations
of the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation (CC) standard [13]. Therefore, we strictly refer to
the implications of these concepts within the technological
jargon, with a deep emphasis on the Internet. We make the
following contributions:
1) We provide a precise definition of the research terms,
privacy and anonymity, and their implications.
2) We analyze the main threats against privacy and
anonymity and their originators.
3) We share a resume of the state of art in terms of the
protection of the privacy and anonymity on the Internet.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 we analyse the main threats against privacy and
anonymity and their originators. In Section 3, we show the
current methodologies applied to gain control over the pri-
vacy and anonymity of the users. We enumerate the current
technologies available to protect privacy and anonymity on
the Internet in Section 4. In Section 5 we introduce the
proposed improvements over the state of the art. We present
our conclusions in Section 6.
A. Privacy
In the past few decades there have been several debates
about the precise definition of privacy. The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights [12] in both article 12 and 19, references
the concept as a human right:
Article 12: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interfer-
ence with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
attacks upon his honour and reputation [...]
Article 19: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion
and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions
without interference and to seek, receive and impart informa-
tion and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.
Other authors refer to privacy as “the claim of individuals,
groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how,
and to what extent information about them is communicated
to others.” [25]
According with the CC standard [13], privacy involves
“user protection against discovery and misuse of identity by
other users”. In addition, the CC standard [13] defines the





Thus, we consider the definition of privacy as a framework
of requirements that prevents the discovery and identity of the
user.
B. Anonymity
As stated before, anonymity is intrinsically present in the
concept of privacy. Nevertheless, anonymity refers exclusively
to the matters related to the identity. The CC standard [13]
defines “[anonymity] ensures that a user may use a resource
or service without disclosing the users identity. The require-
ments for anonymity provide protection of the user identity.
Anonymity is not intended to protect the subject identity. [...]
Anonymity requires that other users or subjects are unable
to determine the identity of a user bound to a subject or
operation.” [13] [21]
Accordingly, we consider the definition of anonymity as the
property that guarantees user’s identity from being disclosed
without consent.
C. Other concepts involved in privacy & anonymity
1) Pseudonymity: Notwithstanding, the use of anonymity
techniques can protect the user from revealing their real
identity. Most of the time there is a technological require-
ment necessary to interact with an entity, thus, such entity
requires to have some kind of identity. The CC [13] claims




















service without disclosing its user identity, but can still be
accountable for that use.
2) Unlinkability: In order to guarantee a protection of the
user’s identity, there is a need for unlinkability of the user’s
activities within a particular context. This involves the lack of
information to distinguish if the activities performed by the
user are related or not.
3) Unobservability: The CC standard [13] refers to this
concept as “[unobservability], requires that users and/or
subjects cannot determine whether an operation is being
performed.”. Other authors claim that unobservability should
be differentiated from the undetectability [21]. The reasoning
behind this, claims that something can be unobservable, but
can still be detected. In this paper we refer to unobservability
as the property that guarantees the impossibility to distinguish
if something exists or not.
II. BACKGROUND
Historically, the control of the communications and the
flow of information, are mandatory for any entity that aims
to gain certain control over the society. There are multiple
entities with such interests: governments, companies, indepen-
dent individuals, etc. Most of the research available on the
topic claims that the main originators of the threats against
privacy and anonymity are governmental institutions and big
corporations[16]. The motivations behind these threats are
varied. Nevertheless, they can be classified under four cate-
gories: social, political, technological and economical. Despite
the relation between them, the four categories have different
backgrounds.
A. Social & political motivations
The core of human interaction is communication in any
form. The Internet has deeply impacted in how social inter-
action is conducted these days. The popularity and facilities
that the Internet offers, makes it a fundamental asset for the
society. Currently, it is estimated that there are more than 2.7
billion individuals users of the Internet in the world[24].
Fig. 1: 460 Million IPv4 addresses on world map (2012)[5]
Any entity that gains any level of control over this massive
exchange of information, implicitly obtains two main advan-
tages: the capability to observe the social interaction without
being noticed (hence, being able to act with certain prediction),
and the possibility to influence it. Privacy and anonymity are
the core values against these actions. Nevertheless, several
authoritarian regimes implemented diverse mechanisms for the
dismissal of both, privacy and anonymity.
Many of the authors highlight that the foundations of these
threats are most often motivated for ideological reasons[16],
thus, in countries in which free of speech or political freedom
are limited, privacy and anonymity are considered an enemy
of the state. In addition, national defense and social “morality”
are also some of the main arguments utilized when justifying
actions against privacy and anonymity[8].
According to the OpenNet Initiative[1], there are at least
61 countries that have implemented some kind of mechanism
that negatively affects privacy and anonymity. Examples of
these countries are well-known worldwide: China[26], Iran[2],
North Korea and Syria, among others. In addition, recent
media revelations1 shown that several mechanisms that are
negatively affecting privacy and anonymity have been imple-
mented in regions such as the U.S. and Europe.
B. Technological issues
There are some cases in which the threats against privacy
and anonymity occur due to the lack of proper technology.
Sometimes these threats can occur unintentionally. An ex-
ample of this are bugs in software that are not discovered
and somehow reveal information about the identity or data of
the users. Also, misconfigured Internet services that do not
use proper encryption and identity mechanisms when offering
interaction with their users. Certain techniques utilized by the
ISPs can lead to situations in which the user’s data and identity
gets compromised even if the ISPs’ intentions are focused on
bandwidth optimization. Finally, non-technological educated
users can be a threat to themselves by unaware leaking their
identity and data voluntarily but unaware of the repercussions
(e.g. usage of social networks, forums, chats, etc).
C. Economical motivations
As stated previously, the impact and penetration of the
Internet in modern society affects almost every aspect of it,
with a primary use of it for commercial/industrial purposes.
There are multiple economical interests that are related directly
to the privacy and anonymity of the users. Several companies
with Internet presence take advantage of user’s identity in
order to build more successful products or to target a more
receptive audience. Lately, the commercialization of user’s
data has proven to be a profitable business for those entities
that have the capability of collecting more information about
user’s behavior. In addition, due to the popularity of Internet
for banking purposes, the privacy and anonymity of the users
are a common target for malicious attackers seeking to gain
control over user’s economical assets.
1Global surveillance programs: PRISM(UK), Tempora(NSA), Muscular
(NSA)
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III. MECHANISMS USED TO INTERFERE PRIVACY AND
ANONYMITY
In the past few decades, a big technological and economical
investment has been made by some entities seeking to gain
some control over the privacy and anonymity on the Internet.
Nevertheless, there are not too many commercial technolo-
gies developed with this particular purpose[16]; forcing the
development of custom solutions adapted to the particular
use case/target. Depending of the originator, the technology
utilized can have different types of targets, the most com-
mon being nodes and individual users on the Internet. The
categorization of the technology falls in two areas: hardware
and software solutions. The devices utilized for these targets
are commonly denominated Deep Packet Inspection (DPI)
devices. Their main use is the classification of the network
traffic, together with the inspection of packet headers and
payloads. Note that most of these devices are not manufactured
to directly target the privacy and anonymity of the users.
Instead, they have a generalist purpose (commonly associated
to routing and QoS purposes). Nevertheless, these devices can
be configured in ways that the privacy and anonymity get
affected.
We will analyze the different threats using the OSI model[7]
as reference, highlighting the most common compromises on
terms of privacy and anonymity across the different layers.
A. Physical Layer
Any possible threat on the physical layer implies direct
access to the hardware involved in the network. Most common
artifacts utilized are known as network taps: devices that
provide access to the data flow of the network once they are
attached to it. These devices can be used either to monitor the
network silently (sniffing) or to redirect the full traffic of the
network to a different node. Implicitly, any observation of the
network traffic involves the possibility of affecting the privacy
and anonymity of the traffic.
B. Data link layer
Most of the hardware solutions targeting the data link layer
focus on the media access control (MAC) sublayer. It is in
the MAC sublayer that certain filters can be implemented.
The addressing of the destinations occurs in this layer, which
are unique. This is the first control point for those entities
that are aiming to obtain some information concerning user’s
identity, data flows and destinations. Note, the property of
uniqueness of the MAC address and the current standard 2,
allows the categorization of the devices present in the network.
This can lead to a premature identification of the user (by
manufacturer/model).
C. Network layer
Due to the nature of the Internet protocol suite, and the use
of Internet Protocol (IP) as its core; the network layer plays a
crucial role while interfering with the privacy and anonymity
2Referring here to the assignation of MAC address schemes by manufac-
turer
of the network traffic. Most of the DPI hardware focused on
the network layer targets the inspection of the IP packets. The
IP packets contain all of the relevant information required for
routing purposes. Therefore, it is a mandatory target when
aiming to reveal the identities of the users. The analysis is
performed mainly on the IP header; more specifically, on the
source address, destination address and protocol type. This
data can be utilized with different malicious purposes; the
analysis and processing of IP headers can lead to the direct
identification of the user involved in the communication.
Fig. 2: IPv4 header fields commonly targeted (red)
Furthermore, statistical analysis can be performed to deter-
mine the population of users even if they are using encrypted
protocols over the IP[6]. Finally, the identification of the
protocol utilized, provides enough information to perform
further analysis of the data that the IP packet is transporting.
This makes the network layer a critical asset for inspecting the
network traffic. It is in this layer where some of the entities
previously mentioned implement heavy traffic analysis and/or
filtering.
D. Transport layer
The Transport Control Protocol (TCP) is the most popular
protocol on the transport layer on the Internet protocol suite.
There is an agreed assumption that TCP remains to be the main
transport protocol on the Internet, thus it is the most targeted
when interfering with the privacy and anonymity of the users.
A TCP header contains (among other data) the source port and
destination port. This information makes it possible to identify
(in most cases) what type of application is being used over
TCP; therefore allowing it to determine the kind of inspection
required to capture the data transmitted in the TCP segment.
Despite, the fact that some applications can use TCP ports
out of range of well-known ports, most of the Internet traffic
is based on protocols such as HTTP, SMTP, POP3, IMAP,
etc; for which TCP ports and protocol states are easily
recognized while using DPI techniques/solutions. Therefore,
this facilitates the task of targeting a particular network traffic
and its processing for further analysis. The biggest concerns,
in terms of privacy and anonymity, is that the current tech-
nology allows inspection of every single TCP segment and its
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content. Despite encryption gaining in popularity, in both the
implementation of application protocols and as user practice,
most of the Internet traffic is still unencrypted. Hence, any
traffic analysis that is performed over the transport layer on
unencrypted data reveals the content of the transmission, thus,
eliminating any kind of privacy.
In addition, due to TCP’s architecture, the inspection real-
ized over the data flows is granular and accurate, mainly due
to the possibility to identify sources and destinations, together
with the content of the payload. There is still a possibility in
which the transport layer gets compromised but not the identity
of the source and destinatary. Nevertheless, an observer can
gather enough information to conclude over time, the final
identity of the parties involved, in the case that the payload
contains sensitive data about their identity.
E. Application Layer
The DPI solutions utilized over the application layer
are varied, and sometimes protocol specific[16]. DPI tech-
niques/technologies focused on the application layer provide
the possibility to capture and recompose the data of the
transmission. This generates high-risk threats of the privacy
and anonymity of the users exposing the data of a particular
application that the user is using. Examples include the in-
discriminate analysis of the web traffic that some entities are
performing[16]; resulting in the compilation of user profiles,
type of content visiting, frequency, location, etc. The possi-
bility to cross-reference the analysis of different application
protocols utilized for the same user; building user profiles that
contain all kinds of personal and behavioral information that
gets stored and categorized without the user’s consent.
Due to the fact that it is in this layer where the data
gets originated, other techniques get in place that can affect
the privacy and anonymity. Other popular protocols such as
those dedicated to e-mail, are common targets due to the
sensibility of information that they usually transmit. In this
case, the threats against privacy and anonymity does not
necessarily happen in the transmission, but in the software
itself. Certain entities have implemented control mechanisms
over the software utilized to handle e-mail, such as desktop
clients and webmails.
Several applications make heavy use of encryption tech-
niques in order to secure the communication on the layers
below. Nevertheless, there is a possibility that the methods
utilized by the application protocol to encrypt the communi-
cation are being compromised even before the transmission
begins. Examples of this include possible backdoors recently
claimed[23] on some of the cryptographically secure pseudo-
random number generators (CSPRNG) utilized to generate
encryption keys. If this is the case, certain entities could
decrypt traffic that is thought to be secure by the users,
leading again to an attack of their privacy and anonymity,
even when the users think they are using proper mechanisms to
protect themselves. These recent events open several questions
about how reliable a protocol can be if the cryptographic
assumptions utilized are somewhat misleading.
IV. MECHANISM TO ENFORCE BETTER PRIVACY AND
ANONYMITY
In the previous section we enumerate the different tech-
nologies utilized in order to establish certain controls over the
privacy and anonymity of the users. As it is common when
any mechanism of oppression is enforced, several alternatives
are created in order to avoid those mechanisms. Privacy and
anonymity have been a big concern since the beginning of
the Internet. In addition to those entities that are aiming to
establish the above mentioned controls, there are also several
companies, organizations and individuals, that are spending
time and resources developing mechanisms of defense against
the mentioned threats. We introduce the state of art concerning
the enforcement of privacy and anonymity on the Internet.
A. Technological principles behind the privacy and anonymity
The majority of the techniques utilized to guarantee privacy
are related to a combination of encryption and anonymity
techniques. The vast majority of anonymity techniques rely on
protecting the real identity through a combination of methods
that are difficult to trace the origin and destination of the com-
munication channel. Despite the complexity that encryption
mechanisms can involve, most of the modern and popular
application protocols provide the possibility to establish the
connection through secure channels; either through the use of
the Transport Secure Layer (TLS), or through the configuration
of proxies or socket secure (SOCKS) mechanisms.
There are certain methods to measure the grade of privacy
and anonymity. The degree of privacy is mostly linked to the
type of encryption utilized and computational capacity avail-
able. Different encryption algorithms are currently available,
offering certain guarantees for the users. Several protocols in
the application layer rely on these algorithms as the core of
privacy enforcement. Some examples of this is the use of
public-key cryptography[4] and the use of algorithms such as
RSA[14] and DSA[20]. In addition, and due to recent media
revelations, some applications are moving to new cryptography
schemes based on the use of elliptic curve cryptography
such as Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), Integrated
Encryption Scheme (IES) or Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA). The main argument behind the use
of new cryptography schemes, is the suspected evidences
concerning the pseudo-random number generators utilized for
them, and the possibility of broken cryptography[23]. Further-
more, the possibility to encapsulate the connections through a
SOCKS interface allows the use of routing techniques through
anonymous networks, that are difficult to trace.
B. Proxy server
One of the oldest technologies used to enforce privacy
and anonymity has been the use of proxy servers. Perhaps
due to the simplicity in their functioning, together with their
popularity in the early days of the Internet, proxy servers still
are one of the main technologies in use when enforcing privacy
and anonymity. The function of a proxy server consists mainly
in masking the client requests, providing a new identity, i.e. a
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different IP address possibly located in a different geographical
location. There is a vast number of proxy servers publicly
and privately currently available such as www.anonymizer.ru,
provides integrated proxy solutions within the web browser. In
addition, several lists of free proxies are published daily across
the Internet3, offering all kind of proxies located in different
countries, with different levels of anonymity. Notwithstanding,
proxys servers cannot be considered a reliable method to
guarantee privacy and anonymity by definition. The main
reason being that the proxy server knows the origin and
destination of the requests, therefore, if it is compromised, it
can expose the identity of the users behind its use[17]. Also,
although the proxy server can keep the identity secret, there is
no guarantee that the content of the requests is not being mon-
itored. Therefore, proxy servers cannot guarantee any property
related to plausible deniability and true anonymity/privacy,
thus they should be avoided as method to guarantee privacy
and anonymity as defined in this paper.
C. Onion routing
Onion Routing is a general purpose infrastructure for
private communication over a public network[10]. The core
architecture of onion routing is the implementation of mixed
networks, i.e. nodes that are accepting messages from different
sources and routing them randomly to other nodes within
the network. The messages transmitted between them are
encrypted, and different layers of encryption get removed in
the process of routing while traveling across the nodes[10].
This increases the difficulty of monitoring the traffic (thus
revealing the identity). In addition, onion routing is not node-
dependent, therefore, the compromising of a router does not
compromise the network itself (although can facilitate the traf-
fic analysis). Nevertheless, onion routing has some weaknesses
while protecting the privacy and anonymity of its users.
Recent research[6] shows that even if the traffic is encrypted
and hard-traceable, there are still possibilities to conclude the
population of users and their geographical location. Further-
more, intersection attacks and timing analysis[22], can reveal
user’s behavior within the onion routing network, leading to
further identification of the sources or destinations. Despite
these issues, onion routing is still considered one of the best
alternatives when aiming to guarantee privacy and anonymity.
D. TOR
TOR, previously known as The Onion Router[9], is among
the most popular solutions used these days to protect privacy
and anonymity on the Internet. The main goal of TOR it
is to provide a circuit-based low-latency anonymous com-
munication service[9].TOR’s core architecture is based on
the same principles as onion routing. TOR contains several
improvements over traditional onion routing, including: “per-
fect forward secrecy, congestion control, directory servers,
integrity checking, configurable exit policies, and a practical
design for location-hidden services via rendezvous points”[9].
3anonymousproxylists.net, fresh-proxy-list.net, free-proxy-server-list.com,
freeproxy.ru, nntime.com, etc
Some nodes within the TOR network act as discovery servers,
providing “trusted” known routers, that are available for the
end users. TOR routers have different roles and they can be
classified as:
• Middle-relay: receive traffic and passes it to another relay
• Bridges: publicly listed and their main goal is to provide
an entry point on networks under heavy surveillance and
censorship
• Exit-relay: the final relay before reaching the destination
and are publicly advertised
Fig. 3: TOR functioning. (Source: EFF)
TOR has won popularity across the most common Internet
users. The main reason (in addition to its enforcement of
privacy and anonymity) is due to the fact that the it is free-
software and there are multiple cross-platform clients avail-
able. In addition, several extensions/add-ons are available for
the most popular web-browsers, making TOR a very suitable
solution. In addition, because TOR is configurable in most
of the applications through a SOCK interface, TOR can be
used for a broad number of protocols, facilitating anonymity
in different type of services[9].
The success of TOR does not rely only on its core tech-
nology and principles, but on the network of volunteers that
maintain the nodes. Due to TOR’s design, anyone with enough
bandwidth can provide a new router, allowing this to expand
TOR worldwide. Nowadays, TOR network is composed of
more than 5000 routers.
Furthermore, TOR user’s population has been fluctuating
over time. Recent media revelations concerning global surveil-
lance programs, allowing TOR to win even more popularity
across common users, making the network grow considerable,
both on relays and users, in the past months, reaching peaks
of more than 5 million daily connections to the network.
Despite its popularity, TOR is subjected to a certain degree
of the techniques mentioned in Section 3. TOR architecture
does not prevent statistical analysis over its traffic. Some
authors highlight the possibility to interfere in nodes with
high traffic, being able to perform traffic analysis with enough
accuracy that can affect the anonymity of the network[19].
In addition, and due to the publicity of the exit-relays, these
particular nodes can be targeted either for traffic interception
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Fig. 4: TOR relays & bridges available
Fig. 5: TOR user population
or Denial of Service attacks (DoS), affecting the functionality
of the network. Finally, TOR relay advertisement leads to the
generation of blacklists by ISPs and governmental organiza-
tions that are aiming to control mechanisms enforcing privacy
and anonymity, making it difficult for the end users to use
TOR. In Section 5 we introduce the possible improvements to
do in order to comply with the definitions stated in this paper.
V. RELATED WORK AND FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS
In the previous sections, we have analyzed the different
motivations, technologies and state of the art concerning the
threats and enforcement of privacy and anonymity on the
Internet. All of the research available these days focuses
mainly on two aspects related to privacy and anonymity: how
to obtain secure and trustable encryption methods, and how to
guarantee, real anonymous communications.
As of today, there is still no single solution available that
is complaint with the definitions of privacy and anonymity
introduced in Section 1. Nowadays, every communication done
through the Internet that aims to be private and anonymous
requires the use of cryptography and hard-trace routing tech-
niques. Proxies and TOR are among the most used anonymity
technologies[17] and public-key cryptography is the most
popular method aiming for privacy. Nevertheless, it is still
possible to perform different attacks over these techniques,
leading always to some result that invalidate the required
properties for privacy and anonymity mentioned in Section 1.
We introduce some of the possible improvements that current
lines of research are proposing in order to enforce better
privacy and anonymity.
A. Possible solutions for traffic analysis
Traffic analysis (both active and passive), is one of the
primary techniques when targeting networks such as TOR.
Recent research suggests that one way to achieve better
privacy and anonymity over this kind of networks, will be the
generation of random connections to achieve better plausible
deniability[6]. In addition, there are some proposals to obfus-
cate TOR’s traffic, adding delays or artificial traffic, together
with package batching techniques[15]. Theoretically, these
two improvements, will guarantee true anonymity by making
the traffic analysis hard-computable. Nevertheless, there is no
empirical evidence yet, mainly because they have not been
implemented within the production network (i.e. with a real
population of users).
B. Blacklisting techniques
Both proxy servers and TOR routers are suffering black-
listing techniques. Because the implicit principles of both
technologies (available public nodes), it will require a modifi-
cation of how they are used and discovered, in order to avoid
blacklisting. The main proposals aim for using a rendezvous
protocol as the only way to distribute the address of the
nodes[18]
C. Better encryption methods
There is a common effort within the cryptography commu-
nity, to provide more robust and reliable encryption schemes.
In the last year, there has been new contributions related
to Elliptic curve cryptography, specially those not linked
to any corporation or standardization organization such as
the Curve25519[3]. It is expected that several well known
protocols will start using these new cryptography schemes,
thus avoiding the possible backdoors established in the cur-
rent/popular schemes utilized.
D. ISP cooperation
It has been highlighted by some authors[11], that ISPs are
playing a crucial role in privacy and anonymity matters. They
are the main entities responsible for implanting mechanisms
that can affect the privacy and anonymity of the users. Never-
theless, there are not too many “friendly” ISPs in these matters.
Some proposals involve the commitment of the ISP to provide
better quality relay-bridges for TOR[11]. Also, there have been
official requests to get more neutrality and protection from the
ISPs. Nevertheless, all of them are still subjected to the laws




In this paper we introduced the definitions of privacy and
anonymity according to the latest related standards of the field.
We analyzed the main originators behind the threats against
the privacy and anonymity on the Internet; we enumerate their
motivations, together with the techniques and technologies
utilized to control the privacy and anonymity on the Internet.
In addition, we gave an overview of the state of the art
concerning the enforcement of privacy and anonymity on the
Internet, enumerating the most common technologies by the
users, together with their shortcomings. Finally, we introduced
the new lines of research together with their proposals. We
conclude that there is not yet available any method that
guarantees real privacy and true anonymity.
The author considers that despite the reasons given by
governments and corporations, privacy and anonymity are a
human right that must be preserved no matter the channel
of communication used. It is a moral responsibility for the
scientific community to research, develop and implement
better technologies to guarantee our fundamental rights.
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